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Reply by Marisa Linton, Kingston University 
 
I want to thank the editors of H-France for having selected Choosing Terror for this forum.  I also 
want to express my gratitude to the four historians who contributed, all distinguished specialists of 
the Revolution, who read my work with care and, for the most part, with generosity and enthusiasm. 
Three of the four found much of value in my book; they also raised interesting questions and points 
for further reflection. For that scholarly engagement I thank them. The fourth evidently disliked my 
book, but the Terror has always been a subject that provokes strong reactions, and criticism too can 
be revealing, though not always in the way that its author intended.  
 
I am very grateful to Jennifer Heuer for her insightful and even-handed analysis. Her lucid 
exposition is attentive to each of the book’s successive arguments, showing how these layers of 
argument should be understood in relation to one another. Guillaume Mazeau, who has himself been 
working on political transitions and the problem of stabilizing politics after a revolution, pays 
special attention to my discussion of “agency,” and the difficulties confronted by revolutionary 
politicians who were trying to forge a new kind of politics, and I found his comments interesting.  
Michel Biard’s thoughtful analysis is of particular value, for it goes to the heart of the book’s 
climactic stages, during the Year II. Biard’s appreciation of my work is particularly welcome as he 
has himself been researching the parallel theme of deputies who died a violent death during the 
Convention and is shortly to publish a book on the subject. His review situates the experiences of 
the revolutionary leaders (the protagonists of Choosing Terror) within the wider context of the 
Convention as a whole and, thus, gives me fresh perspectives on the implications of my own work. 
Jennifer Heuer, Michel Biard, and Guillaume Mazeau provide perceptive accounts of many of the 
themes of my book, which formed part of the experience of revolutionary politics: virtue, friendship, 
authenticity, deception, conspiracy, corruption, ambition, fear, agency, identity, and politics as 
ideology, strategy, and inter-personal relationships. 
 
Let us start with the issue of complexity. All parties (except perhaps the fourth reviewer, Donald 
Sutherland) agree that I have written a complex book. Mazeau thinks that I may have tried to say 
too much and admits that my book left him at times feeling “un peu désorienté.” I do not deny that 
my book is both complex and—in the sense that it sets out to say something new about that most 
vexed subject, the French revolutionary Terror—ambitious. I have been researching and teaching 
the French Revolution and its ideological origins for over twenty-five years now, so this book is the 
summation of a great deal of research and reflection. It was a conscious decision on my part not to 
base my book on a single overarching explanatory theory, for example to say, as so many have done, 
that any single ideology—or even the ideology of virtue—caused the Terror. Perhaps most 
importantly I was troubled by the Furetian notion that the revolutionary leaders were somehow just 
prisoners of a discourse. Had I done so it would have made life easier for both myself and the 
reviewers, but would have made for what to my mind would have been a far less interesting and less 
accurate book, one open to charges of teleology and reductionism.  Rather, I decided to write 
Choosing Terror as an open text exploring the successive ideological, tactical, and personal dilemmas 
that led people in the extraordinary circumstances of revolutionary politics to end up participating 
in terrible processes; in effect, at a certain moment “choosing terror.” I constructed the text around 
the experience of revolutionary leaders, giving weight to the different dimensions of their political 
lives—ideological, tactical and personal.  I consciously tried to not reduce the thrust of the book to 
the progress of an ideology studied only through the intellectual utterances of leading 
revolutionaries; nor to claim that it was all about rivalry, faction, and personal egos (though that 
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certainly played a part); and to make the point that the whole picture looks different if we take into 
account the private evidence that illuminates both strategies and emotions. Only a multi-layered 
account can do justice to the present state of studies in these areas and hopefully advance our 
collective understanding. I was particularly concerned to show how a constraining dialectic emerged 
between the concept of virtue and the demands of an emerging and problematic revolutionary 
politics. If the book is complex, it is because the revolutionary leaders, seen from this perspective, 
were indeed complex. Mazeau suggests I could have gone more deeply into some subjects, such as 
the extent of Mirabeau’s involvement in conspiracy and the secret dealings of Louis XVI. No doubt I 
could have done so. But a book also has to be readable, and, as Mazeau himself concedes, it would 
not have been practicable to include further evidence: this is already a long and detailed book. 
 
I accept that the multiple threads of the text may make navigation through it a challenge for 
readers. Multiple views, such as those in this forum, show us that all of us read a book differently. 
For these reasons I want to take this opportunity to clarify the book’s central questions and discuss 
their implications.  First let me state clearly that the book is not intended to be a general history of 
revolutionary politics. Neither is it a general history of the Terror, many of which exist and none of 
which is, or perhaps ever could be, definitive. In reality there were multiple forms of terror. Some 
historians, above all Jean-Clément Martin, have argued—convincingly in my view—that it is 
problematic to speak of “the Terror” at all, and that the idea of a “system of terror” was invented 
retrospectively by the Thermidoreans. So we would be studying an ex post facto construct. 
Certainly the best known, most iconic form of terror was the legalized terror of 1793 to 1794, which 
was characterized by a series of coercive laws that enabled suspects to be put on trial before special 
tribunals, of which the best known was the Revolutionary Tribunal in Paris. As I discussed in my 
Introduction, in recent years, Jean-Clément Martin, Annie Jourdan and other historians have 
claimed that this legalized terror involved some effort to hand out justice—albeit severe justice—
based on evidence.[1] As Heuer and Biard acknowledge, to a large extent I agree with this 
argument, at least when it addresses the legalized terror as a whole. But my own subject was not 
this particular iconic form of terror, but another form not so far singled out for a research analysis. I 
looked at the genesis of a very specific form of terror—what I call the “politicians’ terror”. I gave it 
this appellation because it seemed to me be connected to, but substantially different from, “the 
Terror”—as well as being an emblematic element of the French Revolution’s history for two 
centuries, for who has not heard of the deaths of Danton and Robespierre? As such it merited a 
distinctive approach, one developed in the light of recent work. 
 
In my view, the “politicians’ terror” was the terror that revolutionary leaders meted out to one 
another, but which is best not subsumed into other general explanations. The revolutionary leaders 
were of course themselves “subject to terror.” This took two forms. First, revolutionary leaders were 
liable to arrest under the laws that enabled terror, as successive laws removed their parliamentary 
immunity and criminalized the “wrong” political opinions. Second, they were subject to the emotion 
of terror. Fears that they could not openly acknowledge—because innocence was meant to be 
fearless and fear was a sign of consciousness of guilt—increased in intensity, above all during the 
critical period between March 1793 and July 1794; this fear in turn influenced revolutionary leaders’ 
choices. Ironically, leaders had much more cause to fear the Terror than most of the Parisian 
population. A high proportion of the leaders of the Revolution (above all those who either were or 
had been members of the Jacobin club) died violent deaths, either under the guillotine or by their 
own hand. The politicians’ terror climaxed in a series of trials and executions of revolutionary 
leaders during the Year II: the Girondins, the Hébertists/Cordeliers, the Dantonists, and—executed 
without any form of trial beyond identification before the Revolutionary Tribunal—the 
Robespierrists.  These trials of political factions were some of the most notorious trials of the 
Revolution. The trial of the Dantonists became one of the most iconic moments of the Revolution 
and has often been the subject of literary and theatrical retellings. For many observers since the 
Revolution, the Danton Affair epitomized the dark heart of the French revolutionary Terror.  
Dramatists and novelists have repeatedly tackled the subject; and it has frequently been equated 
with show trials under twentieth-century totalitarian dictatorships.   
 
Despite this continued interest, the nature of the factional trials is not well understood. Whilst these 
trials constituted a travesty of justice for the victims, they were also atypical of the processes of the 
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Revolutionary Tribunal. In contrast to the vast majority of cases heard by the Revolutionary 
Tribunal, justice had little to do with the terror that politicians dealt to one another. The trials of 
political factions during the Year II were among the most ruthlessly manipulated of the whole 
Revolution. These were trials in which revolutionary leaders actively intervened in the legal 
process: they initiated the cases, wrote the narratives that criminalized the suspects as 
“conspirators”, appeared as witnesses, and put pressure on the Tribunal’s officials to secure 
convictions. The suspects on trial in their turn, when they had the opportunity to speak, talked the 
same language of virtue, authenticity, and corruption, protesting their own virtuous motives, whilst 
accusing their accusers of corruption and duplicity. Almost without exception, during the Year II, 
once a deputy or other leading political figure was sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal, he or she 
was condemned to death. Again, this contrasts sharply with the figures as a whole for outcomes of 
trials before the Revolutionary Tribunal. 
 
Why were these trials of political leaders so ruthless? My book explains that a key factor was 
mutual fear on the part of the protagonists. From April 1793 the deputies of the Convention had no 
immunity from arrest and could be imprisoned subject only to the agreement of the Convention 
itself. There was a practice of denunciation, which itself was interwoven with the rhetoric on virtue. 
Fear was not the only motive for the trials of the factions, of course; it has to be factored in 
alongside many other motives, ideological, tactical and personal. The revolutionary leaders who put 
fellow revolutionaries (in many cases former colleagues and friends) on trial were motivated partly 
by their suspicion of factions and disunity as being “conspiratorial.” In many cases they also acted 
out of a genuine conviction that political opponents were at best financially and politically corrupt, 
and at worst in league with the foreign powers. But it was their own fear that made the perpetrators 
so pitiless in their handling of the factions. They were under pressure from all sides and vulnerable 
to denunciation themselves, both from the Paris popular militants—the sans-culottes—and their 
leaders and from other deputies in the Convention itself. They were also well aware that if a fellow 
revolutionary leader returned acquitted from the Revolutionary Tribunal, as Marat had done, then 
the first thing he was liable to do was use his political power and influence to seek revenge upon the 
men who had put him there. 
 
Therefore, in writing an analysis of the “politicians’ terror” I found it necessary to coin a new term 
for a process often confused with or assimilated to the general “Terror,” but which should actually 
be seen as distinct in many (though not all) ways. This is particularly important because the 
politicians’ terror involved a series of trials in which justice played little part, that are so often taken 
as emblematic of not just “the Terror” as a whole, but also of the revolutionary endeavor itself. My 
point is that it is important to see the politicians’ terror as distinct, with different origins, a different 
evolution, and different structure. It was not the whole Terror, nor even entirely typical of it. 
 
Moreover, in one important way the politicians’ terror and the fear that underlay it help us to 
understand aspects of the laws that enabled the broader “Terror.” The majority of the 
Conventionnels were politically unaligned; they neither sat with the Montagnards nor attended the 
meetings of the Jacobin Club. Nonetheless they voted for laws on terror. Why did the more 
moderate deputies—men who afterwards disclaimed any wish to have chosen terror—vote for the 
laws that enabled it? There were two possible reasons: either at the time and in that extreme 
situation they agreed with the necessity for those proposed laws; or they voted them under duress, 
out of fear for themselves. Both those motives played a part. In the first half of 1793 there was 
considerable agreement with the need for laws to enable terror against the Revolution’s opponents: 
whatever surviving deputies said afterwards, the laws on terror were a collective choice. The 
balance of motives changed, however, and after the fall of the Girondins many of the deputies 
became anxious about their own vulnerability. That fear reached its climax after the fall of the 
Hébertists and the Dantonists, culminating in June 1794 in the passing of the Law of Prairial, which 
was meant to simplify and rationalize trial procedures, but which led to the seven weeks of the so-
called “Great Terror.” Despite severe misgivings, not least because some of the deputies feared that 
this new law might be used against them, few deputies dared speak out against it in the Convention. 
Ironically, the deputies who were most at risk in the politicians’ terror were those who were most 
politically active, who spoke most in the Convention, attended the clubs, especially the Jacobin Club, 
and drew attention to themselves by their political commitment. Most of the deputies, if they did not 
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protest too loudly at the arrest of their fellows, or show overmuch loyalty to friends who were 
arrested, were left alone. Yet for whatever reason, and if only to not to draw attention to themselves, 
the deputies—most of them not Jacobins—still “chose terror” in the sense that they voted for the 
laws. Thus the politicians’ terror had a direct impact on the laws that enabled the legalized terror to 
take place. 
 
The fact that fear contributed to making revolutionary leaders ruthless was not edifying, nor does it 
make them “blameless” as Sutherland thinks I am arguing. As Biard says in his concluding 
comments, it is not the job of the historian to pass judgment on the dead, but to try to understand 
their lives, their motives, and their experiences, and then leave it to the readers to decide for 
themselves if blame is appropriate and, if so, where blame lies. The concept of the “politicians’ 
terror” helps us to make more sense of what otherwise seems so inexplicable. That does not mean 
that this form of terror against politicians was justified. On the contrary, my study is, if anything, a 
cautionary tale, the story of a how a tragedy unfolded, written to try to understand the 
unacceptable. If we fail to appreciate that the men who directed terror were also subject to terror 
(both as a system of laws to which they were subject and as an emotion that they felt) then there is 
much that we will not understand about the traumatic politics of the Year II. 
 
Subjects can be open-ended and books have to end. Choosing Terror did not venture into the period 
after the fall of Robespierre primarily for reasons of length. Heuer is right to say that I could have 
gone further into of the question of whether the politicians’ terror ended with Thermidor. To take 
up her point briefly, terror against deputies continued after Thermidor. In some ways it even 
escalated: the number of killings decreased, but the arrests increased. This is in itself significant and 
calls into question the standard periodization of “the Terror” and the old argument that Thermidor 
definitely “put an end to terror”. The routine purging of deputies was intrinsic to the difficulties 
inherent in setting up a stable form of politics, difficulties that persisted throughout the period of the 
Convention and beyond it. Yet the political situation after Thermidor was not the subject of my 
research—a decade of research is probably enough on what was basically a five year period—and I 
think it appropriate to leave that subject to historians who are in a better position than I am to 
discuss it—most notably Mette Harder and Michel Biard.[2] That is why my figures for the 
politicians’ terror are “incomplete” as Sutherland puts it.  
 
Heuer regrets that I do not say more about women’s participation in revolutionary politics. I regret 
it too, but the reality was, as Heuer acknowledges, that hardly any women were involved directly in 
politics at the level of leadership, excepting of course the inimitable Madame Roland. Women are 
there in my book, but they remain for the most part shadowy figures.[3] They were most visible in 
the public galleries of the assemblies and the clubs, rowdy in their support of their favorite speakers, 
especially Robespierre. They are in the Fraternal Society of Two Sexes, in their meeting place 
beneath the Jacobin Club, where Barnave goes down to court them using the language of virtue, 
accompanied by the disapproving English spy Williams Miles. We catch glimpses of them when 
their menfolk are under arrest, fighting for their lives, as when Madame Brissot stonewalls her 
interrogators, persisting in her story that she just occupied herself with the household, ironed her 
husband’s shirts, and had no idea who came to the house on political business. A few women stand 
out clearly on the scaffold, for a brief moment before their lives were snuffed out. One of the most 
powerful of such images was that of Lucile Desmoulins and Marie Hébert, whose husbands had done 
so much to destroy one another, embracing at the foot of the guillotine, in defiance of politics, in 
defiance of death. 
 
Mazeau’s feeling of disorientation when reading my book may account for one or two points he 
makes in his review which I, in my turn, found confusing. Danton did not present himself as a 
“champion de la vertu”—far from it, though Brissot and Robespierre certainly did—a divergence in 
their strategies that my book makes clear. The coup of Thermidor did not eliminate Robespierre 
“sans violence”—but with extreme violence. Chapters nine and ten of my book are devoted to the 
political build up to Thermidor, which resulted in the bloody purge of the group around 
Robespierre, with over 100 victims who perished, without trial, over three days. By setting this 
build up in a complex longer term context going back to 1789, I hoped to excite some debate over 
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the question of agency that proves so problematic in attempts to suggest that “the Terror” is 
inherent in the ideologies of 1789. 
 
Deciding how—and at what to point in my narrative—to give a name to groups and factions was a 
problem with which I was repeatedly faced and to which I responded with a degree of pragmatism 
and compromise. We all know how groups shift and sometimes defy the usual nomenclature, and 
only a beginner would unwittingly make crude mistakes here. We all grapple with who was and 
who was not a Jacobin, a Montagnard, a Girondin, a Brissotin, a Feuillant, a Robespierrist, a 
Dantonist, a Cordelier, or a Hébertist and all the rest of the endlessly shifting names. An added 
complication is that many of these names were invented by opposing factions, who used them 
against their rivals as terms of indictment or abuse. Several of the reviewers picked up on this in 
different ways. Mazeau was troubled that I used the term “Jacobin” quite loosely and in places where 
Montagnard would be more accurate. Anyone who works on this period should of course 
understand his concerns, and there are no points to be scored between professionals. I had two 
reasons; the first was that I was trying to keep things a little simpler for non-specialist readers. Here 
I had in mind the many students I have taught who so often struggle to get their heads round the 
kaleidoscopic changes of name and faction. As I stated in the Introduction, for the sake of non-
specialist readers I thought it best to use as few names as possible, and to try to avoid constantly 
changing them.  Sometimes I used labels because to repeatedly write phrases such as “Brissot and 
the group of vaguely interconnected people, brought together at that moment in part by shared 
aims, but often more by friendship, with whom he had quite close connections, sometimes for 
example having dinner with them” reads so awkwardly, though certainly more accurately. I chose 
instead to call them “Girondins” and get on with the sentence. Opting for the wrong nomenclature 
only matters if it misleads the reader. I tried repeatedly to make it clear that the factions were 
endlessly shifting, and that people chose sides—if at all—often very late in the day. That was a key 
part of my argument. It is very difficult to discuss revolutionary factionalism without having 
recourse to names as labels, but ironically these very names were often given to individuals 
retrospectively, by their enemies, as a process of identifying them as part of a faction, hence of a 
conspiracy. Thus I speak in chapter nine of “the Robespierrists” even while stating explicitly that 
the existence of “the Robespierrists” as a distinct group was not evident until after their arrest. Even 
Saint-Just was only definitively defined as a “Robespierrist” by Robespierre’s opponents when he 
stepped forward to defend Robespierre on 9 Thermidor, and even at that moment Saint-Just was 
still insisting that he “belonged to no faction.” By using the names of factions we are, in a sense, 
reading the story backwards—from the point where the revolutionary leaders ended up or where 
they were placed by their judges when they were condemned to death. I tried to write my narrative 
forward, to experience the uncertainty of outcome along with the protagonists, as though we did 
not, as historians, know already how it would end and what identities people would eventually adopt 
or have imposed upon them. This is why I used the term Jacobin where possible. It is all too easy to 
forget that the Jacobins were originally one group, welcoming members with diverse views. I 
wanted to start from that moment and show them changing along the way; to point out that 
Barnave, the Lameths, Brissot, Robespierre, each had their successive moment of domination in the 
Jacobin Club. In retrospect the fractures that developed on ideological and factional lines amongst 
the Jacobins look more apparent now than then, but they were not so evident to Jacobins of 1790, or 
even 1791. As several reviewers noted, I wanted to emphasize that for a long time the Girondins and 
the Montagnards were Jacobins together and to explore the processes that drove them apart into 
opposing factions. The closer one looks, the less important absolute ideological differences seem to 
have been in that fascinating process of divergence.  
 
Donald Sutherland’s review makes for curious reading. Its approach is very different to that of all 
the other reviews Choosing Terror has received, not only for the forum but the many reviews 
elsewhere. There is some positive assessment, but it is evident that Sutherland is not much 
interested in the arguments and ideas in my book, even going so far as to assert, “Ideology or even 
ideas do very little work in Linton’s schema,” a contention that contrasts with the other reviewers, 
all of whom devote considerable space to the role of ideas in my book, particularly the ideology of 
virtue. In view of Sutherland’s own empirical approach I take the criticism as ironic. Of course it will 
not do to say, if this is what he means, that terror was all the consequence of ideology, and that is 
precisely why I made a more complex argument. It soon becomes apparent that his real concern is 
H-France Forum 9:4 172 
 
twofold—first, whether I have said enough on the provincial terror, and, second, my sympathy for 
Robespierre, which he considers to be excessive. 
  
The provincial terror is of course Sutherland’s own specialism and a very important topic as I stated 
in Choosing Terror’s Introduction—but it is not the subject of my book. Sutherland is correct, of 
course—if a little patronizing—to point out that the revolutionary leaders did not act in isolation 
from provincial contexts. Recent and not so recent research does indeed suggest that the kinds of 
tensions and dynamics seen in the politicians’ terror in Paris were also played out elsewhere at a 
local level and in a changing but specific local context.[4] Sutherland says I could have said more 
about certain deputies: Collot d’Herbois (he has 12 separate entries in Choosing Terror’s index), 
Fouché (3 separate entries), Fréron (9 separate entries), and Barras (3 separate entries). It is true 
that I do not discuss Carrier, but Sutherland more than makes up for this lamentable omission in his 
own review. Again, no doubt I could have done more to show the interconnections between Paris 
and the provinces, but not without writing a much longer or indeed a different book. I venture to 
hope my study will prompt others to explore some of these issues. I would have particularly liked to 
have had the space to discuss the experiences on mission of some of the leading revolutionaries 
whom Sutherland has himself omitted, including Saint-Just, Couthon, Le Bas and Augustin 
Robespierre, and how these experiences in turn fed into their views of the situation in Paris.   
Whilst there were certainly connections between politics in Paris and in the provinces, there was 
also a great deal of miscommunication and confusion. As to what Robespierre knew of the activities 
of the deputies on mission whom he had recalled, the obvious point here is that the victors of 
Thermidor, including the men Sutherland mentioned, had both incentive and opportunity to 
suppress evidence incriminating them. As an example I recounted in my book how Fréron and 
Barras not only asked for and received the extraordinary sum of 800,000 livres for their activities on 
mission, but subsequently claimed to have lost it in an accident whilst travelling (p. 230). How much 
of their activities did Robespierre know? Enough to refuse to speak with them (p. 242). Enough for 
both of them to join a conspiracy to destroy him. Despite the destruction of so much evidence by the 
Thermidoreans we can make fairly reliable guesses as to which Montagnards Robespierre 
considered culpable by observing which ones were panicked enough to take the risk of engaging in 
the plot that would bring him down before he could denounce them.  
 
Sutherland declares that I say that Robespierre was “blameless” for the Terror. The old story of 
Robespierre as the man to blame is still accepted without question by most non-specialists. It is 
unusual, though, for an expert on the French Revolution to still be making this kind of claim. 
Sutherland’s perspective comes across as somewhat old-fashioned. By loading the blame on to 
Robespierre, making him “take the rap for the Terror,” we avoid looking at more profound reasons, 
more troubling reasons, why terror developed. We can say it was all the fault of that unpleasant 
Robespierre—that Rousseauist, that paranoid man, that power-hungry dictator, that puritan 
obsessed with virtue—and forget that terror was in great part the consequence of a set of collective 
choices. So much of the image of Robespierre as the man behind “the Terror” is invention and myth, 
begun by men who wanted to divert attention from their own involvement in terror and elaborated, 
deepened, and reified over the years into layer upon layer of myth; even to the latest, ridiculous 
story of the “death mask” and its supposedly scientific revelations. Do I think that Robespierre did 
terrible things in support of his vision of the Republic?  Of course. Above all his part in the Law of 
Prairial. But that was not how he began; and the trajectory that he and others took is my subject.  
 
Sutherland’s most surprising—and inadvertently revealing—criticism of my book comes when he 
compares me to Albert Mathiez in my willingness to write an exculpation of Robespierre. Albert 
Mathiez was a great historian, but a historian of his time. Mathiez took up the cudgels to defend 
Robespierre and to expose Danton as venal and complicit in the foreign plot. It is reputed that 
Mathiez so detested Danton’s commemoration as the hero of the Revolution that when he traveled 
to teach at the Sorbonne he routinely avoided the Metro Odéon so as to be spared the sight of 
Danton’s statue proclaiming “Toujours de l’audace!” in sight of the early morning commuters. But I 
am not interested in writing partisan histories. Why would I be? I too am a historian of my time, 
and my interests lie in quite different areas than refighting old battles. If there is any implied 
commentary in my book on new battles, as there must be since the concept of revolution is still so 
contested today, it might just be that politicians operate on many levels and cannot or will not 
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foresee the potential consequences of their words and deeds. Sutherland says I suggest that Danton 
and some other opponents of Robespierre were corrupt. Yes, I do. That is because the evidence 
suggests that many of them were financially corrupt. That does not mean I think they deserved their 
fate, or that they were guilty of conspiracy with the foreign powers.  
 
Sutherland said that he “would like to see the evidence that some Jacobins were looking for a way 
out of the terror … particularly Robespierre.” He seems to have missed the passages in my book 
where I discussed how Robespierre defended over seventy deputies who protested against the arrest 
of the Girondins, preventing them from being sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal, a step which, 
during the height of the politicians’ terror, would have been tantamount to a death sentence. 
Sutherland also passes over in silence my discussion of Robespierre’s persistent efforts to defend 
Danton and Desmoulins; his qualified support for the Dantonists during the earlier stages of their 
campaign; and above all his brief support for the initiative for a committee of clemency (a move fiercely 
opposed by Billaud-Varenne). We know how the story ended, of course. Robespierre changed his 
position on the Dantonists after the revelation of the duplicity of Fabre, and thereafter he was to 
cling to the policy of terror for what remained of his life. But we need not tell Robespierre’s story 
backwards. The point is not to assume that he always was, at heart, an apologist of terror, but to 
understand how he got to that point. Our vision of Robespierre is skewed. We think of him as he 
ended up—defending terror. My interest was seeing how he got there, how he arrived at that 
moment when he chose terror, and no longer saw a possibility of any other way out. That moment 
came late in his life. For Robespierre a personal Rubicon was agreeing to the arrest of his friends, 
Desmoulins and Danton, putting virtue before friendship. He never recovered. 
 
We should not be content to purvey the same old myths about revolutionary politics. “Does it 
matter?” says Sutherland, speaking of my point that the Girondins, not Robespierre, began a 
campaign of personal calumny by saying that Robespierre opposed the declaration of war because he 
was in the pay of the court. To which I reply—yes, it does matter. First, it matters simply because, 
as historians, we should try to be accurate. But it also matters because we need to have a clearer 
understanding of how the politicians’ terror developed and how politicians can choose a path that 
leads to terror, without understanding the possible consequences of their choices. So yes, it does 
matter that it was Brissot and his group that first upped the stakes of the politicians’ terror by 
attacking the integrity of Robespierre for opposing the war; who attacked the immunity of deputies 
by calling for the arrest of Sillery and d’Orléans; that it was the Girondin Birotteau who made the 
call to remove the immunity of deputies; and that it was the Girondins who later succeeded in 
sending Marat before the Revolutionary Tribunal, though all of these measures were to backfire on 
the Girondins themselves, and with deadly effect (pp. 163-4,176). This is precisely my point; it is 
integral to my argument about the political trajectory taken by revolutionary leaders and the 
consequences of their choices. My point about Brissot is not that he made a conscious choice to 
bring about terror, any more than Robespierre did, but that as a politician wielding power Brissot’s 
choices had long-term consequences that he did not anticipate. Brissot was a political lightweight, a 
pamphleteer out of his depth, who made a lot of reckless decisions, of which the most fateful one was 
to use his considerable political clout as a Jacobin leader and leading speaker in the Legislative 
Assembly over the winter of 1791-92 to spearhead the drive to declare war, a war that not only 
contributed considerably to bringing about the revolutionary terror, but also lasted far longer than 
the terror did and claimed many more lives.  
 
A central idea underlying my book’s title was that “choosing terror” came about as an indirect 
consequence of making other, seemingly quite different choices. That is the nature of politics, then 
as now. Hilary Clinton’s latest memoir, by an ironic coincidence entitled Hard Choices (2014), recalls 
her decision to vote in support of war in Iraq in 2002, a decision that has cast a shadow on her 
political career ever since. She claims she had acted as she thought right at the time. Many others 
thought the same way. With hindsight she admits, “But I still got it wrong. Plain and simple.” 
Politicians, thinking that they are choosing war that will end terror, can actually be putting into 
motion a chain of events that may escalate it.  
 
Sutherland thinks that the friendship networks that were so central to Jacobin politics are 
potentially confusing and suggests that “charts” would make the connections clearer.  I can 
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appreciate why he would prefer revolutionaries’ friendships networks to be clear-cut and 
unambiguous—but they were neither. They were shifting, intertwined, sometimes self-interested, 
sometimes altruistic, sometimes fervent, sometimes tepid, and waxed and waned over time. As my 
book makes clear, a further complication was that friendship itself could constitute a suspect political 
category before the Revolutionary Tribunal. Friendship between politicians could be redolent of a 
behind closed doors conspiracy, giving people a powerful incentive to disavow their friends. 
Revolutionaries themselves often were not sure who was a friend of whom or whether their own 
friends were “real” friends or would betray them when the crunch came. There was breathtaking 
loyalty that might make even a cold-blooded historian weep, as when Barnave refused to denounce 
his friends, the Lameths, though he was in prison and the Lameths had emigrated; or when Ducos 
and Boyer-Fonfrède protested so strongly at the arrest of their friend Vergniaud and the other 
Girondins, that they too were eventually arrested and perished with the rest; or when Le Bas on 9 
Thermidor tore himself free of friends who tried to restrain him to demand to share the arrest—and 
soon after the deaths—of Robespierre and Saint-Just. Charts can add nothing to our understanding 
of such instances of loyalty because friendships were not so much about whom a revolutionary 
leader knew as about how he felt about those bonds of friendship. Nor will they help us to 
understand the ramifications of the many betrayals of friendship that took place, whether out of 
diverging convictions or simply out of the understandable desire to save one’s own skin. In order to 
make sense of the role of friendship in revolutionary politics we need, not statistics and charts, but a 
close attention to the human face of the protagonists, empathy with our subjects, and an 
understanding of the value of friendship, accessible through the new history of emotions. Thus this 
book takes seriously the force and importance of emotion in the Revolution. 
 
Mazeau felt the conclusion to my book had a cynical undertone. Heuer was much closer to the mark 
when she picked up on the sense of sadness—the “what was it all for and what did they die for?” 
part. It is true that Choosing Terror has a mournful ending—but that was also the subject matter. 
How could it be otherwise? Most of the protagonists of my book died as a direct consequence of the 
politicians’ terror. Though they began with such high hopes and many achieved admirable things, 
their end was brutal.  It is an intensely sad tale. I had thought of adding a further chapter entitled 
“what they were fighting for,” which would talk about the other side of the coin, what their virtue—
their sacrifice of self—was for. It would be a chapter about liberty, equality, and the rights of all; 
about democracy; about the right to subsistence and an end to poverty; about the right to education; 
about communities where everyone works to secure the well-being of their fellows; and it would be 
about the end to corruption, greed, exploitation, and oppression by a self-interested elite. It would 
look to the future that the revolutionary leaders did not live to see and that, frankly, many of us are 
still waiting to see fully realized. 
 
On a wider note, my book did not set out to say that virtue in politics was wrong and bound to fail. 
On the contrary, it is essential, but we have to think carefully about what we mean by it and what 
we can reasonably expect of politicians. By a coincidence, when I received these reviews I was at an 
international conference on “Vertu et politique: les pratiques des législateurs, 1789 – 2014” attended 
by 250 people. It was not just a history conference about a long-gone past of interest only to 
specialists like myself.  On the contrary, backing for the conference came from a group of deputies 
who are members of the “Club des Amis de l’Incorruptible,” and the current President of the 
National Assembly, Claude Bartolone, thought the subject of sufficient contemporary relevance to 
host a reception for the conference speakers at his official residence, where he spoke to us about the 
need for virtue in political life. A recent poll found that 70 percent of the French think their deputies 
are corrupt. France is beset by a generation that has scant belief in the integrity (modern-speak for 
virtue) of its own politicians. Nor is France alone in facing this problem of cynicism about her 
political leaders. People do not use the term “virtue” now but they do speak of integrity and 
dedication to the public good—and of their opposites: of corruption, self-enrichment, cronyism, and 
disregard for the realities of the lives of the poor. Evidently the world of contemporary politics could 
do with a lot more virtue in it! In that sense there is much to be learned from the revolutionary 
generation. But there are lessons to be learned too in how not to manage politics. It is not viable to 
conduct politics in a situation where the political regime cannot first be stabilized, where the 
opinions of deputies are criminalized, and where they do not have immunity for voicing their 
opinions. Revolutionary transitions are fraught with risks, not least to the people who try to bring 
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them about; and their own lives, along with the lives of the people who are dearest to them, may 
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